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Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The author is a former MI6 chief and UK ambassador to the UN
We always think about Middle East as constructed in the Arab world. Baghdad and Damascus were historical centers of power. In the 20th century, Cairo and Beirut became the cultural capitals of the region until they declined and their influence was overwhelmed by the oil and gas wealth of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
Today, it is surprising that the three most powerful and powerful countries in the region – Israel, Turkey and Iran – are non-Arab countries. Each is led by an aging war horse. Benjamin Netanyahu has been the prime minister of Israel for 17 of the last 28 years. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has ruled Turkey for almost 22 years, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been Iran's supreme leader for 35 years. Like the Bourbons of France 200 years ago, they learn nothing and forget nothing.
After the humiliating tragedy of the brutal Hamas attack of October 7 2023, Israel has gone backwards. Its armed forces and intelligence services have turned the tables, not only on Hamas but on Hizbollah and their backers in Iran. In the process, Netanyahu ignored advice from close friends of Israel and showed little respect for protecting human life. Long-term support for Israel has eroded in the west but its worst enemies are far weaker.
Israel proved to be the new Sparta – a small nation with unequal military power. But its politicians reject the idea that a political solution with the Palestinians is needed if the Jewish nation is to enjoy lasting peace and security. Israel does not have a plan for Gaza beyond an indefinite occupation, except that it is not an undefined one to drive the Palestinians there to Egypt and accordingly to annex as much of the occupied West Bank as possible. One prediction we can make with confidence, sadly, is that an independent Palestinian state will be no closer to the season than it is now.
As the new year begins, Israel's attention is focused on Iran, which was the biggest loser in 2024. Khamenei is looking increasingly weak, both physically and politically. The main candidate to succeed him now is his son Mojtaba. A second generation of autocrats rises to power on the backs of privilege and privilege. They do not bear the scars of struggle or learn the hard lessons of their fathers. Hafez al-Assad was a brutal Syrian leader, but he knew the limits of power and the time to negotiate. His son Bashare did not have those skills. The result was more brutality, and over time the regime collapsed.
The experience of losing their Syrian ally should make the Iranian military wary of dynastic succession. They will try to ensure that the new senior leader does not have all the power within the administration. But the new destabilizing dictators can bring surprises. Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev are obvious examples. Closer to home in Iran is the revolution in Saudi Arabia under Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Each recognized the weakness of their country and sought economic cooperation politics a strategy, often involving openness to the outside world, to support the autocratic system for decades to come. This seems unlikely in Iran but should not be ruled out.
A weakened regime offers an opportunity for new negotiations, even if Khamenei stalls for another year or two. Donald Trump may prefer a political agreement to participate in Netanyahu's preferred military option to destroy Iran's nuclear arsenal. Israel will argue that Tehran will break off negotiations while they make progress on a nuclear weapon, a strategic position that is now more pressing for Iran. These are valid concerns. Khamenei distrusts America even more than US politicians distrust Iran. It may need new leadership in Tehran before Iran changes course.
The most welcome surprise of 2024 was the fall of the Assad regime and the opening of the way to a better future for the Syrian people. Turkey, like Israel, was successful last year but is also having trouble seizing new opportunities. Erdoğan seems to be looking at Syria through the distorted prism of the Kurdish question, which will make it difficult for Syrian opposition leaders to come together and create a new constitution that accepts the diversity – religious and ethnic – of their country.
Erdoğan, who miraculously survived, built Turkey's power throughout the region and in Africa. He has shown that Islamic political philosophy can be successful and does not have to lead to an Islamic government and strict sharia law. Thus, he can provide an example to Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of the HTS Islamist group that currently holds power in Damascus.
There is a lesson here in the western capitals, as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. We are right to be aware of the origin of al-Sharaa excess. But the youth champions' journey from political violence to national leadership is well-trodden. The diplomatic mission ahead is to increase the chances of success in Syria, by being bold in lifting sanctions, lifting sanctions on terrorism and doing everything we can to support the Syrian opposition to unite.
The instinct in western capitals seems to be to pay the price slowly and resist the Islamists for ideological reasons. But that is the path that will make it easy for us to end up divided, like in Libya, or with a new dictator, like in Tunisia. The West must also avoid the mistakes of the Bourbons.