The Israeli military investigation has identified this Jamas On October 7, 2023, the history of Israel was able to carry out the most deadly terrorist attack, as much more powerful Israeli army incorrectly evaluated the intentions of militants and underestimated its capabilities.
“A large-scale, unexpected attack was not considered a probable scenario because of the fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy,” the military said in the resume of the conclusions that were published on Thursday. “IDF and special services perceived Hamas as a limited and reactive threat and suggested that an early warning is preceded by any large -scale offensive.”
The data obtained may put pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to start a widely demanded extensive investigation to study the political decision-making preceding the terrorist attacks that caused this War in gas.
The Prime Minister did not take responsibility for Israel's strategy in the years leading to the attack, saying that he would answer tough questions only after the war, which almost six weeks stopped Due to the cost of the hall. Despite the pressure of society, including the families of about 1,200 people who died as a result of the October 7 attack, and 251, adopted as hostages in gas, Netanyahu opposed the call for the investigation.
The main conclusions of the military were that the most powerful and complex military incorrect intentions in the region were underestimated by Hamas's intentions, underestimated their capabilities and were completely unprepared for the unexpected attack of thousands of strongly armed fighters in the morning of a major Jewish holiday.
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In the comments made by the military commander on Monday, they shared with the media on Thursday, Chief of Staff Army, Lieutenant General Herka Halevi, said he had claimed responsibility for the army failures.
“I was the commander of the military on October 7, and I have my own responsibility. I also weigh all your responsibility – I also consider it as mine,” said Khalevi, who announced his resignation in January and should leave next week.
The conclusions of the military correspond to the conclusions made by officials and analysts. The military released only a brief statement of the report, and the military officials outlined his conclusions.
“On October 7, it was a complete failure,” said one of the military officials of the Associated Press, which acted under anonymity in accordance with the rules.
The central mistake was that Hamas, which seized the gas control in the Palestinian administration in 2007, was more interested in managing the territory than fighting Israel, the investigation showed.
The military also incorrectly assessed Hamas's capabilities, long -appointed the US and Israeli governments. Military planners stipulated that, in the worst case, Hamas would be able to put the invasion of the ground from eight border points, the military official said. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attack routes.
The intelligence, evaluated after the attack, showed that Hamas approached the creation of the offensive in the three previous cases, but postponed it for unknown reasons, said the AP official.
The official also said that a few hours before the attack, there were signs that something was, including when Hamas fighters switched their phones into an Israeli network.
Imagination that Hamas did not want war that manage decisions do not take action that could thwart the attack.
“Faith was that Hamas could affect the pressure that would reduce his motivation before the war, first of all, improving the living conditions in the gas strip,” the report said. “Israel's policy of Gaza was based on the defense, stabilization and efforts to prevent Hamas's military increase, the readiness for short periods (ie days) of direct conflicts and preparation for the escalation scenario.”
Israeli military official told the AP that the exploration shows that Yahia Sinwar, the inspirer of the October 7 attack Died in October last yearHe started planning it in 2017.
With a non -vacation military, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed thousands of fighters to break through or fly over it on Hang Tladers. They knocked out the surveillance cameras and quickly overcome hundreds of soldiers located along the border.
From there, they advanced to the key crossroads and attacked the troops who sent to the area, including some high -ranking officers, violating the team and control of the military, reports the second military official who also made anonymity.
The first three hours after the attack, Hamas fighters held border communities and a slight resistance music festival. It was then that most 251 hostages were accepted, and most people were killed, the AP official said. The official stated that Chaos led to friendly incidents, although he said there were not many without revealing the figure.
It took hours to restore control and days until the area was completely cleared of the militants.
According to the first official, the report has accused the military of convincing confidence in their knowledge and showing enough doubts about their basic concepts and beliefs. The resume said that the key lesson was that Israel could not allow the threat to develop at the border.
It stated several recommendations, including the creation of special units intended for preparation for such surprises and large -scale events, as well as reforms in the military intelligence department, which would contribute to “openness, skepticism, listening, training”.
This is not guilty of individual soldiers and officers, but it is likely to pave the way for calculating military and possible layoffs.
Some high -ranking officers, besides Halevi, also resigned, including the former military intelligence chief.