Stay informed with free updates
Just enter the Middle East politics and society myFT Digest — delivered straight to your inbox.
The author is director of regional security at the International Center for Strategic Studies and editor of 'Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics'
If ever there was a time to get serious about Middle Eastern affairs, 2024 is it. The sequence of events that began in October 2023 has not been a surprise. If the critical mix of tragic, dramatic and strategic episodes will take time to settle, what has already happened will undoubtedly have long-lasting effects.
The diverse and already fragile Levantine society is undergoing major historical changes. In doing so, they are unlikely to receive much outside help given both local uncertainty and global fatigue. This regional restructuring is accompanied by greater violence and renewed competition.
Palestinians are experiencing unprecedented suffering in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli army. Hamas has failed the blood bet, and the inability of its allies to come to the rescue, a reminder, if anyone is needed, that the only course for the Palestinian state is internationalization and the result of negotiations. A bilateral settlement coalition organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries and European nations has emerged as the most likely vehicle for this. The Palestinians will need to be convinced that this is more than a symbolic diplomatic dance but must show ownership of the process, something only the long-awaited Palestinian Authority will do. However, such desires are often reflected in the intransigence of Israel and the burning anger of Donald Trump.
In parallel, Israeli society has gone from extreme trauma to military victory in just over a year. This has reinforced the belief that Israel can only rely on its military power and that the expansion of Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only good but necessary. The unconditional support Israel receives from the US and many European countries has allowed it to express the need for a just peace that will bring security to all.
But this notion of security alone has perverse consequences. It is expensive, increases reliance on the US, and alienates existing and future allies in the neighborhood, who fear that Israel will escalate the conflict by striking Iran's leadership with nuclear weapons. The reputation of the war in Gaza is huge and the legal bills are winding down. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his radical acolytes appears secure as internal fractures in the Israeli state structure grow.
In Lebanon, the opposite dynamics are at play. Hubristic Hizbollah must consider the collapse of its military strategy, ideological narrative and overall credibility. Reviving its resistance ethos is a tall order given the need to lick its deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and its regional difficulties. Many Lebanese who sense an opportunity face two conflicting forces: they realize that they will not get more opportunities to change their situation but they see the danger of provoking the wounded Hizbollah, which could cause a civil conflict.
Above all, Syrians have their first taste of freedom after decades of oppression. The decay of the Assad regime allowed for its rapid collapse, despite the dreaded specter of sectarian violence. Instead, the new Islamic regime in Damascus has shown some restraint and wisdom. Securing peace, however, will require large-scale operations and a commitment to inclusive governance without internal and external spoilers.
At the very least, Syrians can rejoice in the fact that they have exposed the flaws of realpolitik. It is very ironic that, ten years ago, most of the Arab countries and the west wanted the Assad regime to go but the Syrians were divided. Since early December, most Arab and western countries want Assad to stay but Syrians are increasingly mobilized to force internal change. Now they will seek foreign favor. To achieve Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish moderation and US diplomacy will be important. To reassure the Alawite community, Russia's intervention may help. Gulf countries can help reduce Iran's influence.
Iran is the biggest loser in all of this. It cooperated with military forces to increase its influence in fractured countries and beyond divided societies. It expected these groups to advance their interests, instead they were drawn into the wars they started. Turkey seized the opportunity, bypassing Tehran in Syria, the political center of the region.
Many in western capitals will find solace in the fact that so far, this historical transition has been remarkably contained. There is no major migration crisis, no protracted war on the government, no major terrorist attacks outside the region, no sustained impact on oil prices, no disruptive effects on global trade. This is recklessness that paves the way for unwanted shock.