“I think there's a practical answer to that, which is intergovernmental agreements that establish effective safeguards and transparency around equipment, model weights and know-how, and that's what we're working on in our work. The MOU (memorandum of understanding) with the UAE, and I believe it is a sustainable model for a strong technology partnership with this country, as well as with other countries that provide the United States with a number of opportunities. both economic and strategic advantages, the alternative is for them to enter the orbit of Chinese technology, which we do not want.”
About the trade agreements that Asian countries want:
“What countries are looking for, in my opinion, has become increasingly bespoke. It's not just about some kind of broad market access. These are the special needs of a country that is thinking about its economic model for the future. So the economic dialogues we have with these countries and the attractiveness of the United States is simply about: can we lower the barriers to market entry?
“So let me give you some examples. With Japan, they really wanted an MOU on critical minerals so that they would have access to the benefits of the IRA (Inflation Reduction Act). That was their number one question, more important to them than a broader trade deal. It is quite similar to Indonesia. This is what Indonesia is looking for. “Basically, they want to develop a high-standard, critical minerals deal so that Indonesian nickel can flow to America's electric car manufacturing, batteries and other countries.”
On whether American workers and industries have benefited from past free trade agreements:
“So where did the workers fit into that? Now you can say that the employees are suitable for this. They will buy cheaper goods and that is good for them and true to some extent, so I am not against free trade. But it has to have an element of theory about how the US industrial base, the ability to build here, stands, and so I think the IRA (Inflation Reduction Act) and the critical minerals agreement with Japan is a more rational way to think about free trade going forward.
On what Mr. Sullivan learned from his meetings with Mr. Xi and Mr. Wang:
“The biggest thing that jumped out at me came from the meeting with Xi — and it was reinforced in President Biden's meeting with Xi and in the meetings with Wang Yi, but the point was made — that's my point. Look, when we came into office, the Chinese thought was this: If we compete with if you're going to do it, then we won't cooperate with you. You can't have it both ways. And we're just sticking to our theory of controlled competition, “We will compete strongly, but this does not mean that we should not find areas to work together where we have mutual interests. And to compete responsibly, we must continue to engage in military-to-military relations.”
“When we left, the PRC (People's Republic of China) ruled the competition, at least for now, not in the way they talk, but in the way they deal. We found areas to work together: counter-narcotics, artificial intelligence, nuclear risk and climate. We have continuous communications, including military-to-military communications, and we compete, obviously we compete strongly, but there's still an element of stability in the relationship that we're not on the verge of a downward spiral right now. This is a significant evolution over four years in how the relationship is managed on both sides, and it is in line with our relationship management theory that the PRC now reflects.”