The Russian military has prepared a detailed list of possible war with Japan and South Korea that includes nuclear power plants and other civilian infrastructure, according to secret files from 2013-2014 seen by the Financial Times.
Strike plans, summarized in a leaky set of Russian army documents, covering 160 places such as roads, bridges and factories, which were chosen as targets to stop the “regrouping of soldiers in operational areas”.
Moscow's deep concern about its eastern flank is highlighted in documents, shown to the FT by western sources. Russian military planners fear that the country's eastern borders would be exposed in any war with Nato and is vulnerable to attack by US assets and regional allies.
The documents were extracted from a cache of 29 secret files of the Russian military, which focused mainly on training officers in a potential conflict on the country's eastern border from 2008-14 and is still seen as relevant to Russia's strategy.
The FT has this year reported on how the documents contain previously unknown information on the terms of use nuclear weapons and describe the conditions of war to play a The Chinese invasion and deeply afflicted within Europe.
Asia has been at the center of Russian President Vladimir Putin's plan to pursue an all-out invasion of Ukraine and his broader stance against NATO.
In addition to its economic reliance on China, Moscow has hired 12,000 North Korean soldiers to fight in Ukraine while supporting Pyongyang economically and militarily in return. After firing a test missile in Ukraine in November, Putin said that “the regional conflict in Ukraine has taken on global nature”.
William Alberque, a former NATO arms control officer now at the Stimson Institute, said that, together, the leaked documents and the latest deployment of North Korea proved “once and for all that the theaters of war in Europe and Asia are directly and inextricably linked”. “Asia cannot remain without conflict in Europe, and Europe cannot remain passive if war breaks out in Asia,” he said.
The target list of Japan and South Korea was included in a presentation aimed at explaining the capabilities of the Kh-101 non-nuclear cruise missile. Experts who reviewed it for the FT said its content was broadcast in 2013 or 2014. This document is marked with the logo of the Combined Arms Academy, a training college for senior officers.
The US has significant military presence in South Korea and Japan. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both countries have joined an export control coalition led by Washington to put pressure on the Kremlin's war machine.
Alberque said the documents show how Russia saw a threat from its western allies in Asia, who fear the Kremlin will repress them or allow a US-led attack on its military forces in the region, including missile brigades. “In the event that Russia were to attack Estonia out of the blue, it would have to hit the US forces and the equipment of Japan and Korea,” he said.
Dmitry Peskov, Putin's spokesman, did not respond to a request for comment.
The first 82 sites on Russia's target list are military in nature, such as regional command headquarters and Japanese and South Korean military headquarters, radar installations, air bases and naval installations.
What remains are infrastructure areas including roads and railway tunnels in Japan such as the Kanmon tunnel that connects the islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Energy infrastructure is also a key issue: the list includes 13 power plants, such as the Tokai nuclear facility, as well as oil refineries.
In South Korea, the main human targets are bridges, but the list also includes industrial sites such as the Pohang steelworks and pharmaceutical factories in Busan.
Much of the presentation concerned how a hypothetical strike could be carried out using the non-nuclear Kh-101. The chosen example is Okushiritou, a Japanese radar base on a hilly island off the coast. Another slide, discussing such an attack, is shown with a live gif of a massive explosion.
The slides show Russia's care in choosing its target list. The article against two South Korean command and control bunkers includes an estimate of the force required to breach their security. These lists also take into account other details such as the size and potential impact of resources.
Photographs of the buildings at Okushiritou, taken from inside the Japanese radar base, are also included in the slides, along with the exact measurements of the target buildings and facilities.
Michito Tsuruoka, an associate professor at Keio University and a former researcher at Japan's Defense Ministry, said that the conflict with Russia is a particular challenge for Tokyo if it is the result of Russia spreading the conflict from Europe – called “horizontal escalation”.
“In a conflict with North Korea or China, Japan would receive early warnings. We can have time to prepare and try to take action. But when it comes to a sudden escalation from Europe, it will be a short warning to Tokyo and Japan will have few options to prevent a conflict. “
While Japan's military, and air force in particular, have been concerned about Russia, Tsuruoka said that Russia “is not always seen as a security threat by ordinary Japanese”.
Russia and Japan did not sign a peace treaty to end the second world war because of the dispute over the Kuril Islands. The Soviet army captured the Kurils at the end of the war in 1945 and expelled the Japanese settlers from the islands, which are now home to about 20,000 Russians.
Fumio Kishida, Japan's former prime minister, said in January that his government was “fully committed” to negotiations on the issue.
Dmitry Medvedev, the former president of Russia, told X in response: “We do not criticize 'Japanese sentiments'.” . . These are not 'disputed territories' but Russia.”
Russia's plans reflect confidence in its already proven overstretched missile systems. The hypothetical mission against Okushiritou involves the use of 12 Kh-101s launched from a Tu-160 heavy bomber. This document assesses the chance of destroying the target at 85 percent.
However, Fabian Hoffmann, a doctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo, said that during the full-scale attack on Ukraine, the Kh-101 proved to be less sophisticated than expected and struggled to penetrate areas with air defenses.
Hoffman added: “The Kh-101 has an external engine, which is a common feature of Soviet and Russian cruise missiles. However, this design choice greatly increases the missile's radar signature.
Hoffman also noted that the missile was less accurate than expected. “For limited-yield missile systems that rely on precision to destroy their targets, this is an obvious problem,” he said.
The second showdown in Japan and South Korea offers a rare glimpse into Russia's tendency to scrutinize its neighbors' air defenses.
This report summarizes the work of a pair of Tu-95 heavy bombers, sent to test the air defense of Japan and South Korea on February 24 2014. The operation coincides with the insertion of Russia in the Crimea and the US-Korean joint exercise, Foal Eagle. 2014.
Russian bombers, according to the file, left the base of the long-range aircraft command in Ukrainka in the Far East of Russia in a 17-hour circuit around South Korea and Japan to record responses.
It notes that there are 18 interceptors involving 39 aircraft. The longest encounter was a 70-minute escort by a pair of Japanese F4 Phantoms which, according to the Russian pilots, “were not armed”. There are only seven interceptors for fighter jets carrying air-to-air missiles.
The route is almost identical to that taken by two Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft earlier this year when they circled Japan during exercises in the Pacific in September, including a flight over a disputed area near the Kurils.